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PREFACE 
Water  r e s o u r c e  s y s t e m s  h a v e  been  an i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  
r e s o u r c e s  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t  r e l a t e d  r e s e a r c h  a t  IIASA s i n c e  i t s  
i n c e p t i o n .  .As  demands f o r  w a t e r  i n c r e a s e  r e l a t i v e  t o  s u p p l y ,  
t h e  i n t e n s i t y  a n d  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  management mus t  
b e  d e v e l o p e d  f u r t h e r .  T h i s  i n  t u r n  r e q u i r e s  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
d e g r e e  o f  d e t a i l  a n d  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
economic ,  s o c i a l  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  
deve lopmen t  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a i d e d  by  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  m a t h e m a t i c a l  
m o d e l l i n g  t e c h n i q u e s ,  t o  g e n e r a t e  i n p u t s  f o r  p l a n n i n g ,  d e s i g n ,  
a n d  o p e r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s .  
Dur ing  t h e  y e a r  o f  1978  it was d e c i d e d  t h a t  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  
c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  demand s t u d i e s ,  an a t t e m p t  would  b e  made t o  i n -  
t e g r a t e  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  o u r  s t u d i e s  on w a t e r  demands w i t h  w a t e r  
s u p p l y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  T h i s  new t a s k  was named " R e g i o n a l  Wate r  
Management" (Task  1 ,  R e s o u r c e s  a n d  Env i ronmen t  A r e a )  . 
T h i s  p a p e r  i s  o r i e n t e d  t o w a r d s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  s y s t e m s  
a n a l y s i s  t e c h n i q u e s  t o  w a t e r  management p r o b l e m s  i n  Wes te rn  ~ k s n e ,  
Sweden. T h e s e  p r o b l e m s  c o n c e r n  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s c a r c e  w a t e r  and  
r e l a t e d  l a n d  r e s o u r c e s  among s e v e r a l  m u t u a l l y  c o n f l i c t i n g  u s e s ,  
e . g . ,  m u n i c i p a l ,  i n d u s t r i a l ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and  r e c r e a t i o n a l  w a t e r  
u s e .  
The p a p e r  i s  p a r t  of a  c o l l a b o r a t i v e  s t u d y  on w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  
0 prob lems  i n  Wes te rn  S k a n e ,  Sweden, p u r s u e d  by  IIASA i n  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  Swedish  N a t i o n a l  Env i ronmen t  P r o t e c t i o n  Boa rd  a n d  t h e  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Lund. The b a c k g r o u n d  i s  a n  e a r l i e r  TIASA s t u d y  con- 
c e r n i n g  t h e  r e g i o n a l  w a t e r  s u p p l y  p r o j e c t  whose v i a b i l i t y  d e p e n d s  
on how many m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  w i l l  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  i t .  I n  I IASA' s  
Working P a p e r  WP-79-77 some m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  p r o b l e m s  i n v o l v e d  i n  
a l l o c a t i n g  costs o f  s u c h  a j o i n t  p r o j e c t  t o  p r o v i d e  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  
t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  T h i s  companion paper 
desc r ibes  a gaming experiment undertaken f o r  t e s t i n g  some of 
t h e  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  models developed e a r l i e r ,  e s p e c i a l l y  those  
based on some game t h e o r e t i c  concepts.  Although a s i n g l e  gaming 
experiment does no t  provide  s u f f i c i e n t  ground f o r  any f i n a l  
conclusion concerning advantages and disadvantages of  var ious  
c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  models, it g ives  a va luable  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  
problem and i n d i c a t e s  p o s s i b l e  way of t e s t i n g  some of t h e  
t h e o r e t i c  model developments. 
Janusz Kindler  
Task Leader 
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1. BACKGROUND 
T h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w o r k i n g  p a p e r  i s  t h e  IIASA 
w o r k i n g  p a p e r  WP-79-77 b y  H.P. Young, N .  O k a d a ,  a n d  T.  H a s h i m o t o ,  
e n t i t l e d  " C o s t  A l l o c a t i o n  i n  Wat5r R e s o u r c e s  D e v e l o p m e n t  - A 
C a s e  S t u d y  o f  Sweden" .  
. . 
A l t h o u g h  t h e  r e a d e r  i s  a d v i s e d  t o  f i r s t  r e a d  WP-79-77, a 
b r i e f  summary s h a l l  be made o f  t h o s e  p a r t s  of  t h a t  p a p e r  w h i c h  
a r e  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  r e l e v a n c e  t o  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  r e p o r t e d  i n  t h i s  
p a p e r ,  so t h a t  i t  c a n  b e  r e a d  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  WP-79-77. 
WP-79-77 d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how costs s h o u l d  be 
a l l o c a t e d  i n  a w a t e r  p r o j e c t  when d i f f e r e n t  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  
j o i n  t o g e t h e r  t o  d e v e l o p  w a t e r  s u p p l i e s .  
The cost  a l l o c a t i o n  p r o b l e m  arises f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  
are,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  e c o n o m i e s  of scale  i n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of 
water f a c i l i t i e s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t w o  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  c a n  i n  many 
cases g e t  t h e i r  w a t e r  demand s a t i s f i e d  more c h e a p l y  b y  b u i l d i n g  
a j o i n t  f a c i l i t y  t h a n  b y  b u i l d i n g  s e p a r a t e  o n e s .  T h e  a m o u n t  o f  
c o s t  s a v i n g s  depends  o n  which m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  j o i n  t o g e t h e r ,  
t h e  g r e a t e s t  cost s a v i n g s  o f t e n  r e s u l t i n g  when two a d j a c e n t  
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  j o i n  t o g e t h e r .  One problem of cost a l l o c a t i o n  
i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s u c h  a  c o a l i t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  f i x e d  costs o f  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  p l a n t  c a n n o t  b e  a s s i g n e d  t o  t w o  m u n i c i p a l -  
i t i e s  o b v i o u s l y  i n  any u n i q u e  way. 
One c a n  o n l y  p r o p o s e  v a r i o u s  p r i n c i p l e s  o n  which  such 
a l l o c a t i o n s  s h o u l d  depend.  S u i t a b l e  p r i n c i p l e s  c a n  be  found,  
e .g .  i n  game t h e o r y .  One p r i n c i p l e ,  b a s e d  on " i n d i v i d u a l  
r a t i o n a l i t y " ,  i s  t h a t  n o  m u n i c i p a l i t y  s h a l l  pay a  h i g h e r  cost 
t h a n  it would have  t o  pay i f  it w e r e  to, f u l f i l l  i t s  w a t e r  n e e d s  
comple te ly  on  i t s  own. I f  w e  c a l l  t h e  costs t h a t  t h e  m u n i c i p a l i -  
t i e s  A and B i n c u r  i f  t h e y  work c o m p l e t e l y  o n  t h e i r  own C ( A )  
and c ( B ) ,  a n d  t h e  payments  t h e y  s h a l l  make i n  c a s e  o f  a  c o a l i t i o n  
xA and xBt  t h e n  w e  r e q u i r e  a c c o r d i n g  to  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  
< c ( A )  and xB < c ( B ) .  X~ - - 
Another  p r i n c i p l e ,  which w e  c a l l  t h e  " f u l l  costn p r i n c i p l e ,  
i s  t h a t  t o t a l  c o s t s  s h o u l d  be covered ,  l e a v i n g  no s u r p l u s  and 
no loss to  any t h i r d  p a r t y .  For  example, t h e  t o t a l  costs o f  
t h e  c o a l i t i o n  AB are c a l l e d  c ( A B )  and w e  r e q u i r e  t h a t  xA + xg 
= c (AB) . 
I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  w e  are, however, n o t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
c o o p e r a t i o n  between o n l y  t w o  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ,  b u t  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  
where cost s a v i n g s  a r e  a l s o  o b t a i n e d  a s  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  j o i n s  t h e  I 
1 
two-party c o a l i t i o n  and f u r t h e r  a s  a f o u r t h  p a r t y  j o i n s  t h i s  
t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n ,  etc.  I n  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  c a s e ,  w e  s t u d y  
a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which s i x  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s 1  are i n v o l v e d  and 
"AS a  matter o f  f a c t  t h e r e  are s i x  g r o u p s  o f  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  a s  
d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r .  
w h e r e  t h e  t o t a l  cost  when a l l  s i x  c o o p e r a t e ,  i s  lower t h a n  t h e  
t o t a l  cos t  o f  a n y  o t h e r  c o m b i n a t i o n .  
B a s i c  r a t i o n a l i t y  p r i n c i p l e s  w o u l d  t h e n  s a y  t h a t  t h e  " g r a n d "  
c o a l i t i o n  o f  a l l  s i x  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  s h o u l d  b e  f o r m e d ,  s i n c e  
e a c h  p a r t y  c a n  t h e n  b e  i n  a b e t t e r  s i t u a t i o n  t h a n  i t  c o u l d  b e  
u n d e r  a n o t h e r  a r r a n g e m e n t  i n v o l v i n g  h i g h e r  t o t a l  costs.  
T h e  cos t  a l l o c a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  t h e  s i x - p a r t y  c a s e  a r e  
r o u g h l y  t h e  s a m e  a s  i n  t h e  t w o - p a r t y  c a s e .  I n d i v i d u a l  
r a t i o n a l i t y  w o u l d  demand t h a t  x .  < c ( i )  f o r  i = 1 ,  ..., 6 a n d  t h a t  
1 - 
6 
Z x  = c ( N ) ,  i w h e r e  N i s  t h e  " g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n " ,  i n v o l v i n g  a l l  i = l  
s i x  p a r t i e s ;  
I n  t h i s  c a s e  o n e  c a n  a d d  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  demand ,  n a m e l y  
" g r o u p  r a t i o n a l i t y " ,  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  C x .  < c ( S )  f o r  e v e r y  
1 - i ES 
c o a l i t i o n  S ,  w h i c h  is  s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n .  T h i s  
i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  c o n s i s t i n g  of p a r t i e s  1 ,  2 ,  a n d  3 
would  - n o t  a g r e e  t o  p a y i n g  x l ,  x 2 ,  x 3 ,  i f  t h e  p a y n e n t s  x l  + 
X2 + X 3  a r e  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  t o t a l  costs w o u l d  be t o  t h e s e  t h r e e  
p a r t i e s  i f  t h e y  o n l y  f o r m e d  t h e  t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  1 2 3 .  
T h e  set  o f  a l l  a l l o c a t i o n s  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  t h r e e  p r i n c i p l e s  
s t a t e d  a b o v e ,  ( i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  f u l l  cos t ,  g r o u p  r a t i o n -  
a l i t y ) ,  are s a i d  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  " t h e  core". I n  some c a s e s  t h e  
core m i g h t  n o t  e x i s t ;  i n  many c a s e s ,  l i k e  t h e  o n e  s t u d i e d  i n  
t h i s  p a p e r ,  i t  e x i s t s ,  b u t  i s  i n  n o  way u n i q u e .  
T h e r e  are several ways  of o b t a i n i n g  a  u n i q u e  a l l o c a t i o n  
w i t h i n  t h e  core. I n  WP-79-77, t h r e e  w a y s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d :  t h e  
N u c l e o l u s ,  t h e  P r o p o r t i o n a l  L e a s t  C o r e ,  a n d  t h e  Weak L e a s t  
C o r e .  Common t o  a l l  t h r e e  o f  t h e s e  c o n c e p t s  is  t h a t  t h e  s o l u -  
t i o n  i s  o b t a i n e d  b y  a p p l i c a t i o n  of l i n e a r  p r o g r a m m i n g ,  w h e r e  
o n e  s e e k s  t o  minimize  some k i n d  o f  s u b s i d y  r a t e  and t h a t  one  
d e d u c t s  some t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h i s  s u b s i d y  r a t e  from t h e  t o t a l  
cost o f  e a c h  c o a l i t i o n .  The c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  t h e  LP-program hence  
imply  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  sum o f  t h e  payments  made by t h e  
members o f  a  s p e c i f i c  c o a l i t i o n  s h o u l d  n o t  e x c e e d  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  
o f  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n  minus some t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h i s  s u b s i d y  r a t e .  
The t h r e e  ways o f  o b t a i n i n g  a  c o r e  s o l u t i o n  d i f f e r  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
2  t o  t h e  way t h e  s u b s i d y  r a t e  i s  t r a n s f o r m e d .  The LP-program 
d e t e r m i n e s  a  u n i q u e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  s u b s i d y  r a t e ,  which  i n  t u r n  
g i v e s  a  un ique  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n .  
The t h r e e , c o r e  c o n c e p t s  a l s o  d i f f e r  i n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
t h e y  s a t i s f y  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  m o n o t o n i c i t y  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h a t  i f  t o t a l  
c o s t s  go up, no  p a r t y  s h o u l d  be  c h a r g e d  less and i f  t o t a l  c o s t s  
g o  down, no p a r t y  s h o u l d  b e  c h a r g e d  more. 
I n  WP-79-77 a  f o u r t h  s o l u t i o n  c o n c e p t  b a s e d  on  game t h e o r y  
i s  d i s c u s s e d :  The S h a p l e y  Value .  One way o f  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h i s  
v a l u e  i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  The g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  is  formed s t e p  by 
s t e p ;  f i r s t  o n e  p a r t y  j o i n s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a n o t h e r  p a r t y  t o  form 
a  two-par ty  c o a l i t i o n .  Then o n e  more p a r t y  i s  added  t o  form a  
t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n ,  a n d  t h e n  a n o t h e r  p a r t y  i s  added t o  form 
a  f o u r - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n ,  e tc . ,  u n t i l  f i n a l l y  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  
i s  formed. T h e r e  are many ( i n  a n  n-person game: n!) ways o r  
o r d e r s  i n  which  s u c h  a p r o c e d u r e  can  t a k e  p l a c e ,  depend ing  on- 
which p a r t y  " s i g n s  up" f i r s t ,  which p a r t y  " s i g n s  up" n e x t .  For  
e a c h  such  o r d e r ,  a  p a r t y  j o i n i n g  a  c o a l i t i o n  i s  t h o u g h t  o n l y  t o  
pay  , t h e  i n c r e m e n t a l  costs ( i . e .  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween t h e  cost 
o f  t h e  new c o a l i t i o n  and  t h e  cost o f  t h e  o n e  h e  j o i n s ) .  The 
Shap ley  v a l u e  f o r  e a c h  p a r t y  i s  t h e n  t h e  p a r t y ' s  a v e r a g e  payments ,  
computed o v e r  a l l  n! c o a l i t i o n  f o r m a t i o n  o r d e r s .  
2 ) ~ o r  f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  see pp.  10-14 o f  WP-79-77. 
To make t h i s  m o r e  c o n c r e t e ,  l e t  u s  l o o k  a t  a  3 - p e r s o n  game 
w i t h  A,B, a n d  C  a s  p l a y e r s .  T h e r e  a r e  t h e n  6 p o s s i b l e  o r d e r s  
f o r  c o a l i t i o n  f o r m a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n c r e m e n t a l  c o s t s  
f o r  e a c h  p a r t y :  
I C o s t  a s s i g n e d  t o :  





The S h a p l e y  v a l u e  o f  e a c h  p a r t y  i s  t h e n  t h e  sum o f  t h e  v a l u e s  I 
CAB c ( A C )  - c ( C )  
CBA c(ABC) - c ( B C )  
i n  h i s  c o l u m n ,  d i v i d e d  b y  6 ;  i . e . ,  f o r  A  it i s  [ 2 c ( ~ ) + 2  [ ~ ( A B c )  I 
c (A) 
c (A) 
c ( A B )  - c ( B )  
c(ABC) - c ( B C )  
I 
c (ABC) - c (AC) Ic (C)  ! ! 
I 
c ( B C )  - c ( C )  
F i n a l l y ,  a  f i f t h  m e t h o d  i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  WP-79-77. T h i s  i s  
- .  
c (C)  
< . . . . 
I 
a  m o d i f i e d  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  S e p a r a b l e  C o s t - R e m a i n i n g  B e n e f i t s  (SCRB). 
c(AB) - c ( A )  
c(ABC) - c ( A C )  
c (B)  
c ( B )  
T h i s  method  h a s  b e e n  d e v e l o p e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  u s e  i n  
- - I 
c (ABC) - c ( A B )  
c(AC) - c ( A )  
c(ABC) - c(AB)  
I 
c ( B C )  - c ( B )  I 
w a t e r  r e s o u r c e  p l a n n i n g .  W e  d e f i n e  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  f o r  a  p a r t y  
c '  (i)  a s  c ( N )  - c ( N - i )  , i . e .  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  b e i n g  t h e  l a s t  
t o  j o i n  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n .  N e x t  t h e  " r e m a i n i n q  b e n e f i t "  r ( i )  
i s  d e f i n e d  a s  = c ( i )  - c l ( i ) ,  i . e . ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o s t  
i f  th ;  m u n i c i p a l i t y  g o e s  a l o n e  a n d  i t s  m a r g i n a l  costs.  T h e  p a y m e n t  
made b y  p a r t y  i i s  t h e n  c o m p u t e d  a s  x = c l ( i )  + 
N N i 
r / ) c N  - .Z c ' ( j 1 ,  i . e . ,  m a r g i n a l  cost  p l u s  i t s  
j = 1  j = 1  
s h a r e  o f  t h e  n o n - a l l o c a t e d  c o s t s ,  w h e r e  t h e  s h a r e  i s  set i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p a r t y ' s  s h a r e  o f  r e m a i n i n g  b e n e f i t s .  1 
. 8 
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  r e a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  s o u t h e r n  Sweden (Western 
~ k % n e )  , a  c o s t  t a b l e  f o r  v a r i o u s  c o a l i t i o n s  was computed u s ing  
d i f f e r e n t  p rocedure s .  Although i n  r e a l i t y  t h e r e  a r e  18 municip- 
a l i t i e s  i n  t h i s  r e g i o n ,  it was found p r a c t i c a l  a n d r e a l i s t i c  t o  
group t h e s e  i n t o  u n i t s  which might  be r ega rded  a c t i n g  a s  inde-  
pendent  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  
The compos i t ion  o f  t h e s e  s i x  groups  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  d e t a i l  
i n  WP-39-77. For  t h e  pu rpose  o f  t h i s  pape r  it i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
n o t e  t h a t  t h e  symbols A , H ,  K, L, M and T deno te  t h e  main municip- 
a l i t i e s  i n  each group,  namely, h g e l h o l m ,  H3 l s ingbory ,  Kavl inge ,  
Lund, Malmd and T r e l l e b o r g .  
Then t h e  j o i n t  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  was computed f o r  each o f  t h e  
p o s s i b l e  c o a l i t i o n s  t h a t  t h e s e  s i x  m u n i c i p a l i t y  groups  c o u l d  
form. The r e s u l t s  a r e  g iven  i n  Appendix A ,  where c o s t s  a r e  
s p e c i f i e d  i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  Swedish Crowns. 
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  i n  Appendix A ,  t h e  a l l o c a -  1 
t i o n s  w e r e  computed a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  f i v e  p rocedure s  d i s c u s s e d  ~ 
above. These a r e  g i v e n  i n  t h e  t a b l e  below. 
Method A H K L M T 
Shapley Value 20.01 10.71 6.61 10.37 16.94 19.18 
Nucleolus 20.35 12.06 5.00 8.61 18.60 19.21 
P r o p o r t i o n a l  L e a s t  Core 19.81 12.57 4.35 9.25 19.85 17.99 
Weak L e a s t  Core 20.03 12.52 3.94 9.07 20.11 18.15 
S.C.R.B. 
c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n s  i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  Swedish Crowns. 
3, 1n WP-79-77 two o t h e r  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  p rocedure s ,  based  on  
s p e c i f i c  d a t a  ( p o p u l a t i o n  and demand) w e r e  a l s o  used. 
Not used i n  t h e  exper iment ,  they.  a r e  o m i t t e d  h e r e .  
I n  WP-79-77, t h e  SCRB a n d  t h e  S h a p l e y  v a l u e  p r o c e d u r e s  a r e  
c r i t i c i z e d  m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  n o n e  o f  t h e m  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
of g r o u p  r a t i o n a l i t y .  L e t  u s  l o o k  a t  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  HKL. A c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e  SCRB p r o c e d u r e ,  HKL s h a l l  t o g e t h e r  p a y  2 9 . 8 1 ,  a n d  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e  S h a p l e y  v a l u e ,  2 8 . 0 0 .  S h o u l d  t h e y  n o t  j o i n  t h e  g r a n d  
c o a l i t i o n ,  b u t  r e m a i n  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t h e  t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  
HKL, t h e y  w o u l d  o n l y  h a v e  t o  p a y  t h e  cos t  of t h i s  c o a l i t i o n ,  o r  
2 7 . 7 0  (see A p p e n d i x  A ) .  H e n c e  n e i t h e r  t h e  SCRB n o r  t h e  S h a p l e y  
V a l u e  b e l o n g  t o  t h e  core: I t  s h o u l d  be n o t e d  t h a t  SCRB i s  c o n -  
s i d e r a b l y  f u r t h e r  a w a y  from t h e  " m a r k "  t h a n  t h e  S h a p l e y  v a l u e .  
H a v i n g  c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  SCRB a n d  t h e  S h a p l e y  v a l u e ,  t h e  a u t h o r s  
o f  WP-79-77 i n v e s t i g a t e  o t h e r  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  t h r e e  core s o l u -  
t i o n s .  T h e y  a r r i v e  a t  p r e f e r r i n g  t h e  Weak L e a s t  C o r e ,  s i n c e  
it  i s  t h e  o n l y  o n e  of t h e  t h r e e  w h i c h  a l w a y s  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  
m o n o t o n i c i t y  p r i n c i p l e  m e n t i o n e d  o n  p a g e  4 .  T h e  N u c l e o l u s  
v i o l a t e s  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i n  t h i s  spec i f ic  game;  t h e  P r o ~ o r -  
t i o n a l  L e a s t  C o r e ,  w h i l e  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  m o n o t o n i c i t y  p r i n c i p l e  
i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  game ,  d o e s  n o t  f u l f i l l  i t  i n  a l l  games. 
2 .  GAMING AND NORMATIVE GAME THEORY 
I t  a p p e a r s  r e a s o n a b l e  t h a t  b e f o r e  l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  s p e c i f i c  
g a m i n g  e x p e r i m e n t ,  we b r i e f l y  d i s c u s s  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
g a m i n g  a n d  game t h e o r y ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  when t h e  l a t t e r  h a s  a 
n o r m a t i v e  p u r p o s e .  
0 As  d i s c u s s e d  more e x t e n s i v e l y  e l s e w h e r e  ( S t a h l ,  1 9 7 9 )  g a m i n g  
a n d  game t h e o r y  c a n  be s e e n  as c o m p l e m e n t s  t o  e a c h  o t h e r .  When 
a  game t h e o r e t i c  s o l u t i o n  h a s  b e e n  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of 
a p p l i c a t i o n ,  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  a s k :  Can  g a m i n g  be u s e d  a s  a 
c o m p l e m e n t  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t e d  game  t h e o r e t i c  s o l u t i o n ?  
This  q u e s t i o n  i s  r e l e v a n t  n o t  o n l y  i f  t h e  pu rpose  o f  t h e  
game t h e o r y  a p p l i c a t i o n  is t o  be  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  o r  a  p r e d i c t i o n  
o f  how p l a y e r s  w i l l  p l a y  t h e  game, b u t ,  i n  a cco rdance  w i t h  o u r  
v i e w p o i n t ,  a l s o  i f  t h e  p u r pose  o f  t h e  game t h e o r y  a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  
s a i d  t o  be n o r m a t i v e .  
The r e l e v a n c e  o f  gaming f o r  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  or p r e d i c t i o n  is  
obvious :  D o  t h e  p a r t i e s  p l a y  as d e s c r i b e d  o r  p r e d i c t e d ?  I f  
on e  c a n n o t  g e t  p e o p l e  t o  p l a y  t h e  game a s  p r e d i c t e d  by t h e  
t h e o r y ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  a  g r e a t  many expe r imen t s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e t u p s ,  t h e n  s t r o n g  d o u b t s  a r e  c a s t  on  t h e  t h e o r y  
a s  f a r  a s  i t s  - d e s c r i p t i v e  or p r e d i c t i v e  aim i s  concerned .  4 
With r e g a r d , t o  game t h e o r e t i c  models  p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  a  
normat ive  a im,  it i s  my view t h a t  t h e r e  is o n l y  a  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  
d e g r e e ,  n o t  i n  k i n d .  A s  d i s c u s s e d  e l s e w h e r e  (see e . g .  ~ t s h l ,  
1972, pp. 142-144) a  game t h e o r e t i c m o d e l  c an  b e  c a l l e d  norma- 
t i v e  f o r  a  d e c i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n  o n l y  i f  d e c i s i o n m a k e r s ,  when 
p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  t h e  model ,  w i l l  want t o  u s e  it. Unle s s  one  f o r e -  
sees some s u p e r i o r  norms, e .g .  moral  norms, based  on s o c i e t a l  1 
or r e l i g i o u s  v a l u e s ,  t h e  norms concerned must  b e  r e l a t e d t o  t h e  
norms o f  t h e  d ec i s i o n m ak e r s .  The i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n  is  t h e n :  
Would t h e  d ec i s i o n m ak e r s  want t o  u s e  t h e  game model i f  t h e y  had 
been p r o p e r l y  i n t r o d u c e d  t o  it, and would t h e y ,  a f t e r  h a v i n g  
used  it,  want t o  u s e  it a g a i n ?  
4 ) ~ h i s ,  is. e .  g. y e r y  c l e a r l y  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  Wicksell-w ow ley 
' b i l a t e r a l  monopoly model ,  r e f u t e d  by S i ege l -Fou rake r  and 
t h e i r  f o l l o w e r s  and  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  Nash e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n c e p t  t o  i t e r a t e d  b i - m a t r i x  games, most n o t a b l  t h e  . . 
P r i s o n e r s '  D i l e m m a  games. (For  r e f e r e n c e s  see S t  $ h l ,  1980.)  
One way of testing a normative model experimentally is to 
have the game leader instruct the players about the normative 
model and then to let the participants play the game to see if 
they would use the model. There is, however, at least one 
important problem with such an approach, namely.the problem of 
conformation to authority overriding other benefits in an 
experiment. This implies that, if only one model is "sold", 
and the gaming participants, unlike decisionmakers in reality, 
do not stand to join or lose considerable amounts, they are 
likely to accept the advice of a game leader, since they do not 
want to appear "stupid". The propensity of gaming participants 
for wanting to please the exnerir?.ent leader, when possibly at 
most a few cents is lost thereby, must be taken seriously into 
account. 
In order to avoid such effects, one could in principle do 
one of two things experimentally: 
A )  Several normative theories are presented and the gaming 
participants are then "free", (in the sense of being "uninfluenced 
by authority") choose either one. 
B )  One runs the experiment in a llpositivistic way" without 
any "normative influence" in the form of presenting the model. 
On the other hand, one tries to arrange the institutional setup 
in such a way as to increase the likelihood of the parties' 
behaving according to the normative theory. This, for example, 
could be done by supplying the decisionmakers with ample time 
for making the decision, supplying :them with calculating equip- 
ment, by repeating the game so that learning can take place, 
etc. 
Both a p p r o a c h e s  have  t h e i r  a d v a n t a g e s  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s :  
With r e g a r d  t o  A ,  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  s e v e r a l  models  i n  a  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  d e t a i l e d  manner i n  - o n e  e x p e r i m e n t  migh t  b e  v e r y  
time-consuming and i n  many c a s e s  c o n f u s i n g .  One m i g h t  i n s t e a d  run  
o n l y  - one model i n  e a c h  e x p e r i m e n t ,  w i t h  a  new e x p e r i m e n t  and 
w i t h  new s u b j e c t s  f o r  e a c h  model ,  o r  o n e  migh t  r u n  two models  
a t  a  t i m e ,  i n  a  k i n d  o f  tournament .  E i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  methods  
would r e q u i r e ,  however ,  more game e x p e r i m e n t s  and h e n c e  more 
t i m e .  
The main p rob lem w i t h  a p p r o a c h  B is t h a t  i n  many cases t h e  
normat ive 'model  is b a s e d  on s u c h  a  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  r e a s o n i n g  t h a t  
it i s  c o m p l e t e l y . u n r e a s o n a b l e  t o  e x p e c t  any o f  t h e  gaming p a r t i -  
c i p a n t s  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  d e s i r a b l e  s o l u t i o n  on h i s  
own, even i f  t h e  game w e r e  t o  b e  r e p e a t e d  and  l e a r n i n g  w e r e  
al lowed f o r ,  and even  i f  t h e  p a r t i e s  were g i v e n  comput ing  
equipment and ample t i m e  f o r  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s .  
~ 
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  be tween ~ 
t h e  b e h a v i o r a l  a s s u m p t i o n s  o f  t h e  model and  t h e  d e d u c t i o n  o f  
t h e  s o l u t i o n  o n  t h e  b a s i s  of  t h e s e  b e h a v i o r a l  a s s u m p t i o n s  and 
o f  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e t u p .  6 
The main c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  model is i n  h e l p i n g  
t h e  d e c i s i o n m a k e r  w i t h  t h e  d e d u c t i o n  (and t h e  c o m p u t a t i o n )  o f  
- 1 
t h e  s o l u t i o n .  I n  l i n e  w i t h  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n  above,  it i s  - n o t  
r e a s o n a b l e  t h a t  t h e  model s h o u l d  f o r c e  b e h a v i o r a l  a s s u m p t i o n s  I 
on t h e  d e c i s i o n m a k e r .  The s o p h i s t i c a t e d  r e a s o n i n g  o f  t h e  game 
model t h a t  mus t  be a c c o u n t e d  f o r  hence  refers t o  t h e  d e d u c t i o p  
o f  t h e  s o l u t i o n .  
6 ) ~ m o n g  b e h a v i o r a l  a s s u m p t i o n s ,  o n e  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e .  w h a t  i n  
many m o d e 1 s . i ~  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  axioms,  o f t e n  c o n c e r n i n g  
d e s i r a b l e  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  s o l u t i o n  , e . g . ,  t h e  " m o n o t o n i c i t y  ! 
p r i n c i p l e "  above.  One b e h a v i o r a l  a s s u m p t i o n  w o u l d , t h e n  b e  a  ! 
c e r t a i n  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  o v e r  o t h e r  p r i n c i p l e s  
or o b j e c t s .  1 
I 
In contrast to the descriptive and predictive testing of 
the model, where we want to find out whether the players really 
act -- as if they could make these deductions' we want in this 
case only to test whether the parties follow the behavioral 
assumptions of the model. 8 
These behavioral assumptions cannot, however, be tested 
"in vacuum",one by one. Presented one at a time to decisionmakers, 
they appear in most cases as meaningless abstractions. In this 
case, one reasonable way of testing would be the following: 
One starts with as simple a model as possible,3 for which the 
deduction of the solution is no great problem. The normative 
test of the theory then consists of investigating whether under 
some sort of institutional setup, the parties will follow the 
behavior indicated by the theory. If this is true, it might be 
of interest to go on with more complicated versions of the model. 
If, on the other hand, parties do not follow the simple model 
under any institutional setup, one has every reason to raise 
questions regarding its value for normative applications, also 
for more advanced versions of the model. If players do not 
want to adapt tothe behavioral assumptions of the simple nodel, 
it is difficult to see why they should want to do so for more 
7)They do not really have to make the deductions,' but only to 
act as if they had made them, like, for examnle, ~Yiedn~an's 
"poo~shark", acting as if he could solve advanced differential 
equations. 
')Excluding the behavioral assumption that h e  parties have 
great computational and deductive capacity. 
"Even if the model is simple with regard to the deduction of the 
solution, it is, however, important that the full set of 
behavioral assumptions.be involved also for this model. 
complex models. I n  t h e  s imple  v e r s i o n s  o f  t h e  models,  t h e  
deduc t ions  are f a i r l y  e a s y  and it i s  hence n o t  t h e  deduc t ions  
t h a t  pose t h e  problems,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h e  b e h a v i o r a l  assumptions .  
Summing up t h e  d i s c u s s i o n ,  w e  can s t a t e  o u r  claim t h a t  
a " p o s i t i v i s t i c "  exper iment  i s  - one way 05 t e s t i n g  t h e  v a l i d i t y  
o f  a normat ive  game t h e o r y .  Furthermore,  such t e s t i n g  o f  
v a l i d i t y  should  b e  o f  t h e  r e p e a t e d  k ind ,  a l l owing  f o r  v a r i a t i o n s  
i n  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e t u p .  I t  should a l s o  s t a r t  by t e s t i n g  a  
s impler  v e r s i o n  of  t h e  model. 
3 .  M A I N  IDEAS OF THE GAMING EXPERIMENT 
Agains t  t h i s  background it appeared r e a s o n a b l e  t o  test  t h e  
game t h e o r e t i c  models p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  
paper  by a gaming expe r imen t ,  even though t h e  aim o f  t h e s e  models I 
was mainly o f  a  normat ive  n a t u r e .  I 
The cho ice  was between p r e s e n t i n g  s e v e r a l  o f  t h e  models 
w i th  t h e i r  normat ive  i m p l i c a t i o n s  c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  t o  t h e  p l a y e r s ,  
o r  j u s t  making a p l a i n  exper iment  o f  t h e  o r d i n a r y ,  p o s i t i v i s t i c  
type.  The c h o i c e  was g r e a t l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  1 
I 
f o r  conduct ing t h e  exper iment .  I 
I t  was r ega rded  t o  b e  o f  t h e  g r e a t e s t  importance t o  i n v o l v e  
p l a y e r s  who would b e  a s  s i m i l a r  as p o s s i b l e  t o  t h e  a c t u a l .  
- I 
decis ionmakers  f o r  which t h e  model was in t ended .  There  i s  
ample ev idence  from t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on expe r imen ta l  gaming t h a t  
u n i v e r s i t y . s t u d e n t s  i n  many c a s e s  behave q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t l y  from 
people  w i t h  p r a c t i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  b u s i n e s s  o r  government. 
S tuden t s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  s e e m  much more l i k e l y  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  
i d e a  of " b e a t i n g  t h e  average" ,  etc. Being more i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between what t h e y  g e t  and what t h e  o t h e r s  g e t ,  
s t u d e n t s  make t h e  games less c o o p e r a t i v e ,  w h i l e  b u s i n e s s m e n  and  
c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  p l a y  much more c o o p e r a t i v e l y .  Hence,  w e  wanted  
t o  a v o i d  e x p e r i m e n t s  w i t h  o n l y  s t u d e n t s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  would 
h a v e  b e e n  e a s i l y  o b t a i n a b l e .  R a t h e r  w e  wanted  t o  g e t  real  
d e c i s i o n m a k e r s ,  p r e f e r a b l y  w i t h  a  w a t e r  p l a n n i n g  b a c k g r o u n d .  
The U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Lund-IIASA Workshop o n  Water  R e s o u r c e s  P l a n n i n g  
and  Management, November 26-28 ,  1979,  was  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  u n i q u e  
o p p o r t u n i t y ,  s i n c e  it was a t t e n d e d  b y  d e c i s i o n m a k e r s  i n  w a t e r  
p l a n n i n g  f r o m  t h e  i n v o l v e d  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  i n  S o u t h e r n  Sweden. 
A l t h o u g h ,  a s  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e ,  a  g r e a t  number o f  e x p e r i m e n t s  
would b e  n e e d e d  f o r  a n y  k i n d  o f  more s e r i o u s  v a l i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  
models ,  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n s  w e  w e r e  f o r c e d  to  l i m i t  o u r s e l v e s  
t o  o n e  s i n g l e  gaming e x p e r i m e n t .  The main  r e a s o n  was  t h a t  w e  
-
e x p e c t e d  a t  m o s t  t e n  p e o p l e  w i t h  t h e  d e s i r e d  b a c k g r o u n d  a t  t h e  
workshop,  a n d  f o r e s e e i n g  a  c e r t a i n  " d r o p - o u t "  r a t i o ,  t h e r e  would 
m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  b e  enough p e o p l e  f o r  t w o  e x p e r i m e n t s .  The 
i d e a  o f  l e t t i n g  t h e  same i n d i v i d u a l s  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  s e v e r a l  game 
r u n s  a l s o  h a d  t o  b e  r u l e d  o u t ,  n o t  o n l y  b e c a u s e  it would  b e  d i f -  
f i c u l t  t o  g e t  more t i m e  f rom t h e s e  p e o p l e ,  b u t  a l s o  b e c a u s e  
u s i n g  t h e  same p l a y e r s  s e v e r a l  t i m e s  would  p r o v i d e  a n  u n d e s i r a b l e  
f o r m a t  f o r  t h e  r e p e a t e d  r u n s  o f  t h e  game. 10 
So w e  had  t o  se t t l e  f o r  a  s i n g l e  gaming e x p e r i m e n t .  The  
r e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  be low mus t  h e n c e  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  v e r y  prel imi-  
n a r y  i n d i c a t i o n s  a n d  s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h .  The 
"'1f o n e  w a n t s  t h e  same p l a y e r  t o  p l a y  i n  s e v e r a l  games a n d  
a l l o w  f o r  l e a r n i n g  o f  t h e  model ,  o n e  s h o u l d  n o t  l e t  him p l a y  
w i t h  t h e  same se t  o f  p l a y e r s  i n  e a c h  game. Then o n e  d o e s  n o t  
g e t  s e v e r a l  games,  b u t  r a t h e r  o n e  s u p e r  game, w i t h  s o m e  pos-  
s i b l y  p e c u l i a r  e f f e c t s .  
experiment can hopefully be seen as the first one in a series of 
tests. Maybe it can also be used as a background for discussion 
of the model concepts, that is, as a stimuli for generation of 
new ideas and hypotheses. 
Finally, it had to be decided whether one should inform 
the players in advance about the model, or whether the game 
should be played as a simple "positivistic" experiment. Several 
factors spoke for the latter approach: 
1) As mentioned above, it is difficult to give several 
models a fair treatment in a normative experiment of 
this kind. It is reasonable to assume that the order 
in which  you present the models plays a role. The 
participants are more likely, for example, to remember 
the first of the presented models in particular, and 
the last one. 
2) The presentation of the models should take some other 
form than that of simply presenting the contents of 
WP-79-77, since there might then be considerable 
"authority ef fectsgg ." Preferably one should have a 
"proponent" for each model, presenting the case for 
-
this model, like in a referendum. Such a procedure 
was impossible in this case, due to limitations in 
both time and resources. 
'')It should be mentioned that WP-79-77 was available at the 
Lund workshop. However we regarded i,t as unlikely that 
the game participants would be influenced to any extent 
by this. This proved true, since it was found at the de- 
briefing session that none of the game participants had 
studied WP-79-77. 
3) The b r i e f i n g  o f  t h e  gaming p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  a  r e a s o n a b l y  
c a r e f u l  manner would t a k e  e x t r a  t i m e ,  p r o b a b l y  a t  l e a s t  
a s  much t i m e  a s  it would t a k e  t o  r u n  t h e  whole  game. 
Such a n  e x t r a  t i m e  r e q u i r e m e n t  would j e o p a r d i z e  t h e  
r e c r u i t m e n t  o f  s u i t a b l e  gaming p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
4) WP-79-77 was t o  b e  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  Lund workshop 
d u r i n g  o n e  h o u r  r o u g h l y  on  t h e  l a s t  day  o f  t h e  
workshop.  There  was a  c h o i c e  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  t h e  game 
w a s t o  b e  r u n  p r i o r  t o  o r  a f t e r  t h i s  s e s s i o n .  T h e r e  
were  r a t h e r  s t r o n g  r e a s o n s  f o r  r u n n i n g  t h e  game 
p r i0 . r  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p a p e r :  
a )  Some o f  t h e  gaming p a r t i c i p a n t s  migh t  n o t  b e  
i n  a t t e n d a n c e  a t  t h i s  s e s s i o n  and t h i s  would 
l e a d  t o  s p e c i a l  e f f e c t s  o n  t h e  game. 
b )  The p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p a p e r  m i g h t  have  t h e  
b i a s e d  " a u t h o r i t y "  e f f e c t s  d i s c u s s e d  above.  
c )  From t h e  workshop ~ o i n t - o f - v i e w  it 'was p r e f e r r e d  
t h a t  a  v e r y  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  on  t h e  gaming 
e x p e r i m e n t  b e  g i v e n  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h i s  
p r e s e n t a t i o n .  T h i s  was o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i m p o r t a n c e ,  
s i n c e  t h e  game, d u e  t o  i t s  l i m i t e d  o n e - s h o t  
c h s r a c t e r ,  migh t  have  i t s  g r e a t e s t  v a l u e  a s  
a  background f o r  s u c h  a  d i s c u s s i o n .  
4 .  HYPOTHESIS ABOUT THE,OUTCOME OF THE GAME 
F i v e  h o u r s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  a c t u a l  game, I w r o t e  
down t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n j e c t u r e  a b o u t  t h e  outcome o f  t h e  game: 12 
" m o  c o a l i t i o n s  w i l l  be formed r a p i d l y :  
a )  The 3 - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  H K L  s p l i t t i n g  e v e n l y ,  w i t h  9.08 
t o  9.09 e a c h .  P o s s i b l y  t h i s  w i l l  b e  formed a f t e r  t h e  
f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  t empora ry  c o a l i t i o n  HL (12 .50,  1 2 . 5 0 ) .  
b )  The 2 - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  MT, s p l i t t i n g  e v e n l y  19 .70,  19 .71.  
1 L 1 
A copy o f  t h i s  c o n j e c t u r e  was t r a n s m i t t e d  t o  t h e  a u t h o r s  o f  
WP-79-77 f o r  c o n t r o l  p u r p o s e s .  
A f t e r  t h i s ,  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  f o r m a t i o n  w i l l  b e  more d i f f i c u l t  and 
it w i l l  t a k e  a l o n g e r  t i m e  b e f o r e  a  new c o a l i t i o n  i s  r e g i s t e r e d .  
I f  a 4 - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  i s  r e g i s t e r e d ,  i t  would most  p r o b a b l y  
b e  AHKL w i t h  r o u g h l y  9.00 + a s m a l l  amount,  E, t o  e a c h  o f  HKL and 
21.95 - 3~ to  A. 
5 - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n s  are less l i k e l y .  The m o s t  l i k e l y  
o n e  would b e  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  HKLMT w i t h  9.00 to  e a c h  o f  HKL and 
a round  19.50 t o  M and a r o u n d  20.00 t o  T. 
A grand  c o a l i t i o n ,  i f  it comes i n t o  f o r c e ,  would r e s u l t  i n  
r o u g h l y  8.50 to  e a c h  o f  H ,  K ,  and L and a r o u n d  19.44 t o  A ,  M, 
and  T. " 
The  thinking^ b e h i n d  t h i s  c o n j e c t u r e  w a s  b a s e d  on my r e a d i n g s  
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  a g r e a t  many o t h e r  gaming e x p e r i m e n t s  
as  w e l l  as my own e x p e r i e n c e  from s u c h  e x e r c i s e s .  One i m p o r t a n t  
r e s u l t  h a s  been t h a t  p a r t i e s  i n  e x p e r i m e n t a l  n -pe r son  games ( w i t h  I  
e .g. n  > 4 )  v e r y  se ldom s e e m  to  form t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  immedia te ly .  
R a t h e r ,  it is  formed s t e p  by s t e p ,  f i r s t  by  f o r m i n g  two- or  
t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n s  and t h e n  by a d d i n g  o n e  o t h e r  c o a l i t i o n  
or  p l a y e r  a t  a t i m e .  
Another  r e s u l t  h a s  been a s t r o n g  emphas i s  o n  " e q u i t y " .  13 
I n  g e n e r a l ,  p a r t i e s  h a v e  n o t  been w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  pay-ou t s  I 
t h a t  are v e r y  unequal . .  P a r t i e s  who are a t  a " s t r a t e g i c  d i s a d -  
- I 
v a n t a g e "  have  been u n w i l l i n g . t o  r e c e i v e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  less t h a n  I 
t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i e s .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e r e  h a s  o f t e n  been  a t e n d e n c y  
towards  e q u a l  s p l i t t i n g  o f  pay-outs .  
1 3 ) s e e ,  e . g .  S e l t e n  (1979)  
5. THE START O F  THE GAMI NG EXPERIMENT 
The e x p e r i m e n t  was c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  SSK ( S o u t h -  
Weste rn  ~ k % n e  M u n i c i p a l i t y  C o n f e d e r a t i o n )  on  t h e  e v e n i n g  o f  
November 27 ,1979.  
S i x  p e r s o n s  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  m u n i c i p a l  p l a n n i n g ,  m a i n l y  f o c u s e d  
on w a t e r  s u p p l y ,  p a r t i c i p a t e d .  Most, b u t  n o t  a l l  o f  them,  had  
been t a k i n g  p a r t  i n  t h e  workshop.  F i v e  o f  t h e  s i x  p l a y e r s  a r e  
work ing  i n  ~ k g n e ,  a n d  o n e  i n  a n o t h e r  p a r t  o f  Sweden. 
The game t o o k  p l a c e  a r o u n d  a s m a l l  t a b l e ,  w i t h  s i x  s e a t s  
f o r  t h e  p l a y e r s  a n d  o n e  f o r  t h e  game l e a d e r .  The s i x  p l a y e r s '  
s e a t s  were r andomly  a l l o t t e d  t o  t h e  s i x  m u n i c i p a l i t y  roles.  
The c o n f i g u r a t i o n  shown be low w a s  o b t a i n e d :  
Game 
Leade r  
K L .  M 
Next t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t y  roles w e r e  r andomly  a l l o t t e d  t o  t h e  s i x  
p l a y e r s .  
Then t h e  game i n s t r u c t i o n s  were d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  p l a y e r s .  
A t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  game i n s t r u c t i o n s  i s  g i v e n  as Appendix B. 
The i n s t r u c t i o n s  a l s o  c o n t a i n e d  t h e  p a y - o f f  t a b l e  o f  Appendix A ,  
While  t h e  f i g u r e s  i n  Appendix  A r e f e r r e d  o r i g i n a l l y  t o  m i l l i o n s  
o f  Swedish Crowns,  t h e  game was o n l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  s i n g l e C r o w n s .  1 4  
The p l a y e r s  w e r e  a l l o w e d  a m p l e  t i m e  t o  s t u d y  t h e s e  i n s t r u c -  
t i o n s  and  t o  t h i n k  a b o u t  t h e i r  game s t r a t e g y  i n  s i l e n c e .  The 
a c t u a l  game d i d  n o t  b e g i n  u n t i l  e v e r y b o d y  s a i d  t h a t  h e  w a s  r e a d y  
- - 
- 
14)0ne  Swed i sh  Crown i s  r o u g h l y  2 5  c e n t s  i n  U .S.  c u r r e n c y .  
t o  s t a r t  n e g o t i a t i n g .  T h i s  o c c u r r e d  a f t e r  t h i r t y  m i n u t e s ,  
b e f o r e  which t i m e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  were a l s o  a l l o w e d  t o  a s k  t h e  
game l e a d e r  q u e s t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  u n c l e a r  m a t t e r s .  Only a  few 
q u e s t i o n s  were a s k e d  and t h e s e  c o u l d  a l l  b e  answered b r i e f l y '  
by r e f e r r i n g  t o  some p o i n t  i n  t h e  game i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
6. THE ACTUAL PLAYING OF THE GAME 
A f t e r  t h i s  t h e  r e a l  game began.  The f i r s t  t o  form a 
c o a l i t i o n  w e r e  T and M I  who j o i n e d  a f t e r  o n l y  3  m i n u t e s .  T h e i r  
method f o r  d i v i d i n g  c o s t s  w a s  a n  e q u a l  s p l i t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  cost 
s a v i n g s ;  t h a t  i s ,  x ( M )  = c ( M )  - (c  ( M )  + c ( T )  - c (MT).l/2 , g i v i n g  1 9 - 1 2  
t o  M and 20.29 t o  T. 
I n  t h e  meantime H and K s o u g h t  t o  form a c o a l i t i o n ,  l e a d i n g  
t o  t o t a l  c o s t s  o f  22.96. B e f o r e  d i s c u s s i n g  more p r e c i s e l y  how 
t o  d i v i d e  t h i s ,  t h e y  found  t h a t  i n c l u d i n g  L  a s  w e l l  would l e a d  
t o  even g r e a t e r  c o s t  s a v i n g s .  T o t a l  c o s t s  would i n c r e a s e  by 
o n l y  4.30,  w h i l e  L  o n  h i s  own would have  t o  pay .15.88. 
When t r y i n g  t o  form a c o a l i t i o n  HKL, H s u g g e s t e d  a n  e q u a l  
s p l i t  o f  r o u g h l y  9  t o  e a c h .  T h i s  was r e s i s t e d  by t h e  o t h e r  t w o ,  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  by K ,  who would t h e n  o n l y  g a i n  1.91 by j o i n i n g  
t h i s  c o a l i t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  r e m a i n i n g  a l o n e .  Nor would t h e  
p a r t i e s  a g r e e  on  t h e  method a d o p t e d  by MT, t h a t  i s ,  o f  s p l i t t i n g  
t h e  c o s t  s a v i n g s  e q u a l l y .  T h i s  would have  meant t h a t  H would 
have  had t o  pay  11.54,  w h i l e  K would have  g o t t e n  away w i t h  j u s t  
5.37. 
T h e r e f o r e  t h e  p a r t i e s  worked o u t  an agreement  b a s e d  on 
a n o t h e r  f o r m u l a ,  whioh gave  a r e s u l t  t h a t  can  b e  s e e n  as a com- 
promise  between " s p l i t  t o t a l  c o s t s  e q u a l l y o '  and " s p l i t  c o s t  
s a v i n g s  e q u a l l y " :  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  cost s h a l l  be  
b a s e d  on t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o b t a i n e d  when e a c h  p a r t y ' s  payment on 
h i s  own i s  computed a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  o f  t h e s e  
"one-par ty   coalition^"!^ The t a b l e  below g i v e s  a  b e t t e r  exp lana-  
t i o n  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e :  
c o s t  o f  " o n e - p a r t y  p e r c e n t a g e  payment i n  t h r e e -  
c o a l i t i o n "  p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  
I I 17.08 3  9  10.53 
K 10.91 25 6.82 
L  15.88 3  6  9.91 
T o t a l  43.87 100 27.26 
The u s i n g  o f  t h i s  f o r m u l a  r e q u i r e d  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  u s e  t h e  a v a i l -  
a b l e  c a l c u l a t o r .  So a f t e r  8  m i n u t e s  o f  p laying,  HKL r e g i s t e r e d  
a  c o a l i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  d i v i s i o n  H : 10.53,  K : 6 .82 ,  and L  : 9.91.  
A f t e r  t h i s ,  o n l y  A was n o t  i n  any c o a l i t i o n .  P a r t y  A sough t  
t o  j o i n  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  HKL, s i n c e  h e  c o u l d  n o t  g a i n  a n y t h i n g  from 
j o i n i n g  MT. The t o t a l  c o s t  s a v i n g s  by fo rming  t h e  f o u r - p a r t y  
c o a l i t i o n  AHKL i s ,  however,  o n l y  0.26.  For  t h e  p a r t i e s  p l a y i n g  
i n  crowns,  t h e r e  was h e n c e  o n l y  around s i x  U.S. c e n t s  t o  
d i v i d e .  I n  t h e  " r e a l  w o r l d "  t h e r e  w e r e  260,000 Swedish Crowns 
( o r  a round $60 ,000)  t o  d i v i d e .  The members o f  HKL w e r e  v e r y  
r e l u c t a n t  t o  l e t  A i n .  An amount o f  a b o u t  o n e  c e n t  p e r  p l a y e r  
- 
- .  
might  b e  below t h e  " p s y c h o l o g i c a l  t h r e s h o l d  o f  p e r c e p t i o n " .  One 
p l a y e r  a l s o  s a i d  someth ing  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  n a t u r e :  " I n  r e a l i t y ,  
w e  would p e v e r  expand a  t h r e e - m u n i c i p a l i t y  g r o u p  i n t o  a  f o u r -  
m u n i c i p a l i t y  g r o u p  i n  o r d e r  t o  g a i n  o n l y  a round  o n e  q u a r t e r  o f  
1 5 ) ~ h i s  method i s  i n  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  l i t e r a t u r e  known a s  t h e  
" j u s t i f i a b l e  e x p e n d i t u r e  method". See  ~ c k s t e i n  ( 1958) and 
James and Lee ( 1 9 7 1 ) .  
260,000 crowns.  T h i s  i s  a  s m a l l  amount compared w i t h  t h e  many 
m i l l i o n s  w e  g a i n e d  when w e  formed t h e  t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n .  A 
l a r g e r  g roup  i s  a lways  t roub lesome and g a i n s  must  b e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n  o r d e r  f o r  u s  t o  e n l a r g e  t h e  g r o u p . "  
Hence H K L  w e r e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  l e t  A j o i n .  The c o a l i t i o n  MT 
was i n t e r e s t e d  i n  fo rming  t h e  g rand  c o a l i t i o n ,  b u t  it appea red  
t h a t  i n  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  c a s e  n o t h i n g  c o u l d  be done i n  t h i s  d i r e c -  
t i o n  b e f o r e  t h e  AHKL c o a l i t i o n  had been formed. 
According t o  t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  game, however, t h e  game i s  
t e r m i n a t e d  when a l l  c o a l i t i o n s  have  been  i n  f o r c e  f o r  1 0  minu te s  
(see p . 3 0  o f  t h e  game i n s t r u c t i o n s ) .  Even though t h e  game 
l e a d e r  " s t r e t c h e d "  t h e  t i m e  a l l o tmen t1$  no f u r t h e r  c o a l i t i o n s  
c o u l d  be  formed.  And so t h e  game ended w i t h  t h e  o n e  two-par ty  
c o a l i t i o n  MT and o n e  t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  HKL. 
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  MT i n v o l v e s  
Malma and T r e l l e b o r g ,  l y i n g  n e x t  t o  e.ach o t h e r  i n  t h e  s o u t h e r n  
p a r t  o f  t h e  s t u d i e d  r e g i o n .  HKL i s  made up o f  He l s i ngbo rg ,  
KBvlinge, and Lund, a d j a c e n t  t o  one  a n o t h e r  i n  t h e  midd le  o f  
t h e  r e g i o n .  A ,  Angelholm, s i t u a t e d  i n  t h e  v e r y  n o r t h ,  was 
l e f t  a l o n e .  
The game was f o l l o w ed  by a  d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h  t h e  gaming p a r t i -  
c i p a n t s .  T h i s  f o cu sed  p a r t i c u l a r l y  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  a s  t o  which 
pay-off d i s t r i b u t i o n s  would have r e s u l t e d  i f  t h e  game had con- 
t i n u e d  l o n g e r ,  e . g .  n o t  end ing  b e f o r e  a  f o u r - p a r t y  o r  p o s s i b l y  
a  grand c o a l i t i o n  had been  formed. 
A s  f o r  t h e  f o u r - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  AHKL, it was a g r e e d  t h a t  
one  would have d i v i d e d  t h e  s m a l l  c o s t  s a v i n g s  h e r e  e q u a l l y ,  
11;) I n  r e a l i t y ,  t h e  10 m i n u t e s  became 15  minu te s .  T h i s  i s  n o t  
r e a l l y  t h e  way a  game sh o u ld  b e  p l a y e d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  b u t  t h e  
i n t e r e s t  i n  s e e i n g  whe ther  l a r g e r  c o a l i t i o n s  c o u l d  b e  formed 
weighed h e a v i . 1 ~ .  
g i v i n g  e a c h  o f  A ,  H ,  K ,  and L  a  c o s t  r e d u c t i o n  o f  a round  0.05 
t o  0 .07 .  T h i s  would have  g i v e n  21.90 t o  A, 10.45 t o  H ,  6.75 t o  K ,  
and 9 .85  t o  L, a l l o w i n g  f o r  20.05. 
The g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  would have  been formed by a  merger  o f  
AHKL and MT. I t  a p p e a r e d  t h a t  most p a r t i e s  seemed i n  f a v o r  of  
a p p l y i n g  t h e  e q u a l  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  c o s t  s a v i n g s  h e r e  a s  w e l l .  
T h i s  would imply  a  c o s t  r e d u c t i o n  o f  r o u g h l y  0 .75  t o  e a c h  o f  t h e  
s i x  p a r t i e s .  Al lowing  f o r  +0.10 f o r  e a c h  p a r t y ,  I b e l i e v e  t h a t  
one c a n  s a y  w i t h  f a i r l y  g r e a t  c e r t a i n t y ,  t h a t  i f  a  g r a n d  c o a l i -  
t i o n  had been  " e n f o r c e d " ,  i . e .  by a l l o w i n g  f o r  a  much l o n g e r  
n e g o t i a t i o n t i m e ,  w e  would have  o b t a i n e d  A : 21.15, H : 9.70,  
K : 6 .00 ,  L:9.10,  M : 18.37,  and T : 19.50.  
The r e a s o n  why t h e s e  r e s u l t s  are i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  compar ison 
below i s  j u s t  t o  compensate  i n  some way f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o n l y  
10 minu tes  were a l l o w e d  f o r  i n  t h e  game i n s t r u c t i o n s  b e f o r e  t h e  
c o a l i t i o n s  became o p e r a t i o n a l .  By making t h i s  w i d e r  compar i son ,  
w e  s h o u l d  be  a b l e  t o  make a  more r e l i a b l e  compar ison w i t h  t h e  
game t h e o r e t i c  s o l u t i o n s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  1  o f  t h i s  p a p e r .  
7. COMPARISON OF THEORIES AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Comparisons s h a l l  be  made on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  t a b l e  below, 
which summarizes b o t h  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  c a l c u l a t i o n s  o f  WP-79-77 
and t h e  e m p i r i c a l  r e s u l t s  from t h e  gaming e x p e r i m e n t .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  see how w e l l  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  a l l o c a t i o n s  f i t '  
t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a l v a l u e s , w e  s h a l l  u s e  t h r e e  measures  o f  d i f f e r e n c e :  
1 )  The sum o f  a b s o l u t e  d i f f e r e n c e s .  With Ti as  t h e .  
theoretics-l v a l u e  and Ei a s  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a l  v a l u e  f o r  
6 
p a r t y  i, the measure  i s  : Z I Ti - Ei 1 
i = l  6 2  2) The sum o f  t h e  s q u a r e d  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  i . e . ,  Z (Ti - Ei)  . 
i = l  
Compared t o m e a s u r e  1 ,  t h i s  g i v e s  a  h i g h e r  r e l a t i v e  
w e i g h t  t o  l a r g e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s .  
Players 
Theoretical Values 
Shapley Value 20.01 10.71 6.61 10.37 16.94 19.18 
Nucleolus 20.35 12.06 5.00 8.61 ' 18.60 19.21 
Prop. Least Core 19.81 12.57 4.35 9.25 19.95 17.99 
Weak Least Core 20.03 12.52 3.94 9.07 20.11 18.15 
SCRB 19.54 13.28 5.62 10.90 16.66 17.82 
Experimental Values 
Real Agreement 21.95 10.53 6.82 9.91 19.12 20.29 
HKL, MT 
If AHKL (f0.05) 21.90 10.45 6.75 9.85 19.12 20.29 
-
If Grand (fO.lO) 
-
21.15 9.70 6.00 9.10 18.37 19.50 
3) The sum of the relative squared differences, i.e., of 
the squared differences after dividing each difference 
6 2 
by the theoretical value, i.e. L (Ti - Ei) / Ti. 
i= 1 
The idea behind this measure is that a difference is 
more important if it is relatively large in comparison 
with the 88expected" value. 
Computing these measures for the difference between the 
theoretical values and the real outcome of the game, the 
following table is obtained: 
Shapley Value  
Nucleolus  
Prop.  L e a s t  Core 




10 .04  
1 1 . 2 9  
21.10-  
22 .20  
27.94 
W e  see t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t  i s  mainly  independen t  o f  t h e  measure 
used.  The Shapley v a l u e  i s  by any msasure  t h e  best,  fo l lowed  
by t h e  Nuc leo lus .  Then t h e r e  is  a l a r g e  s t e p  t o  t h e  P r o p o r t i o n a l  
L e a s t  Core.  A t  t h e  bot tom we have t h e  Weak L e a s t  Core and 
SCRB. SCRB i s  p o o r e s t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  two measures  and t h e  Weak 
L e a s t  Core a c c o r d i n g  t o  one measure.  
Comparisons w i t h  t h e  AHKL-MT c a s e  would o b v i o u s l y  l e a d  t o  
a lmost  t h e  same r e s u l t s ,  b u t  it might  b e  wor thwhi le  t o  examine 





Prop. L e a s t  Core 
Weak L e a s t  Core 
SCRB 
T h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  f a i r l y  much t h e  same a s  above,  t h e  Shap ley  v a l u e  
s t i l l  b e i n g  on t o p .  But by one measure,  t h e  sum o f  a b s o l u t e  d i f -  
f e r e n c e s ,  t h e  Nucleo lus  i s  somewhat b e t t e r .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  SCRB i s  
a t  t h e  bot tom by any measure.  
8. COMPARISON W I T H  THE PRE-GAME HYPOTHESIS 
A compar ison c a n  a l s o  be made w i t h  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  a b o u t  
t h e  outcome o f  t h e  game, p r e s e n t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  4 .  
The h y p o t h e s e s  t h a t  it would be e a s y  t o  form t h e  3 - p a r t y  
c o a l i t i o n  H K L  and t h e  2 - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  MT w e r e  c o r r e c t .  F u r t h e r -  
more, t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  a b o u t  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  f o r m i n g  a  f o u r - p a r t y  
c o a l i t i o n  p roved  t r u e .  
The h y p o t h e s i s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  way t h e  c o s t s  were a l l o t t e d  
w i t h i n  t h e s e  t w o  c o a l i t i o n s  was, however,  i n a c c u r a t e .  W e  had 
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  d i v i s i o n s  would f o l l o w  a s i m p l e r  c r i t e r i o n  
f o r  " e q u i t y "  t h a n  t h e y  a c t u a l l y  d i d .  It  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  o u r  own e x p e r i e n c e  which  d e a l s  ma in ly  
w i t h  e x p e r i m e n t s  u s i n g  s t u d e n t s ,  m i s l e d  u s  a t  t h i s  p o i n t .  Real  I 
d e c i s i o n m a k e r s ,  a s  ment ioned e a r l i e r ,  a r e  less  l i k e l y  t h a n  
s t u d e n t s  t o  s e e k  s i m p l e  " a v e r a g e "  s o l u t i o n s .  
I f ,  however,  o n e  would r e g a r d  o u r  h y p o t h e s i s  a s  a f o r e c a s t  
- I 
f o r  t h e  s o l u t i o n  w i t h  t h e  2- and 3 - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n s  and  w i t h  I 
A remain ing  a l o n e J 7  t h e  f o r e c a s t  o f  p a y o u t s  would n o t  h a v e  been 
v e r y  bad.  Us ing  t h e  t h r e e  measures  of  d i f f e r e n c e  p r e s e n t e d  
above,  w e  o b t a i n :  5 .69 ,  8 .56 ,  and 0 .90 ,  i . e . ,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  two 
.- I 
measures ,  o u r  h y p o t h e s i s  would b e  even b e t t e r  t h a n  t h e  Shap ley  
v a l u e ,  w h i l e  f o r  t h e  l a s t  measure ,  it i s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  worse .  
9. IDEAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A s  d i s c u s s e d  above,  one  would have t o  r e p e a t  t h e  e x p e r i -  
ment a g r e a t  number o f  t i m e s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  I 
s e t - u p s  b e f o r e  e n t e r i n g  i n t o  any s e r i o u s  discussions r e g a r d i n g  I 
7)Because o u r  h y p o t h e s i s  w a s  r a t h e r  vague ,  s a y i n g  " A f t e r  t h i s ,  t h e  
c o a l i t i o n  f o r m a t i o n  w i l l  b e  more d i f f i c u l t " ,  t h i s  m i g h t  b e  
a somewhat b i a s e d  s u g g e s t i o n .  
t h e  n o r m a t i v e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  mode l s .  The ou t come  o f  t h e  e x p e r i -  
ment  m i g h t ,  howeve r ,  g i v e  some i d e a s  a b o u t  wha t  would  be  t h e  
m o s t  s u i t a b l e  n e x t  s t e p s  of r e s e a r c h .  
The e x p e r i m e n t  o n l y  g a v e  d a t a  t o  compare  t h e  f i v e  me thods  
p r e s e n t e d  a n d  t h e  f o c u s  h a s  s i n c e  b e e n  o n  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  
t h e s e  f i v e  me thods .  I n  o r d e r  t o  k e e p  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  s i m p l e  w e  
e x c l u d e d  d a t a  on  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  demand i n c l u d e d  i n  WP-79-77. 18  
I f  o n e  h a d  i n c l u d e d  t h i s  d a t a  a n d  i f  o n e  c o u l d  s t i l l  h a v e  o b t a i n e d  
t h e  same r e s u l t ,  t h e n  t h e  m o s t  v i s i b l e  r e s u l t  would h a v e  b e e n  
t h a t  t h e  f i v e  m e t h o d s  p r e s e n t e d  h e r e  w e r e  a l l  much c l o s e r  t o  t h e  
a c t u a l  s o l u t i o n  t h a n  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  o b t a i n e d  i f  costs had  been  
a l l o c a t e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  and  demand. Hence ,  it 
would b e  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  see, i f  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  
r e a l l y  w i l l  be  u n a f f e c t e d  by t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h i s  d a t a .  
I f  w e  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  f i v e  me thods  
p r e s e n t e d  h e r e ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s  a s  t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  t h e  
r e l a t i v e l y  p o o r  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  Weak L e a s t  C o r e  a n d  a l s o  o f  t h e  
P r o p o r t i o n a l  Weak C o r e ,  b o t h  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  m o n o t o n i c i t y  r e q u i r e -  
ment  i n  t h i s  game, wou ld  be  improved  i f  o n e  i n  some way e x p l i c i t l y  
i n t r o d u c e d  some d e v i c e  w h i c h  would  make t h e  p l a y e r s  t o  some ex-  
t e n t  aware  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e .  
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  m i g h t  a l s o  g e n e r a t e  s o m e  
. i d e a s  f o r  f u t u r e  t h e o r e t i c a l  work ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  if t h e y . a r e  
s u b s t a n t i a t e d  by f u r t h e r  e x p e r i m e n t s .  
. ' ) S e e  f o o t n o t e  3  on  p a g e  6 .  
1 9 ) ~ n  a l l o c a t i o n  on  t h e  b a s i s  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  wou ld ,  compared  t o  
t h e  r e a l  a g r e e m e n t ,  had  g i v e n  t h e  v a l u e s  55 .93 ,  668.14 a n d  
54 .87  for  d i f f e r e n c e  m e a s u r e s  1 ,  2  a n d  3  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  w h i l e  
an  a l l o c a t i o n  o n  t h e  bas i s  o f  demand would  h a v e  l e a d  t o  37 .45 ,  
307.24 a n d  20.90.  T h e s e  v a l u e s  a r e  r o u g h l y  5 - 20 t i m e s  
h i g h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  t a b l e  o n  p a g e  23.  
Not only the favorable values of the difference measures 
but also the data on the gradual formation of the grand coalition, 
known also from many other experiments, might then focus the 
interest on the Shapley value. It can then be noted that the 
reason the Sbapley value fails to be within the core of this 
particular game, is that the Shapley value assigns equal proba- 
bility to every coalition being formed. One can envisage here a 
modified Shapley value, which for this game, and also many other 
games, 20 would lie within the core. The modification would 
consist of eliminating from the formula those coalitions which 
do - not increase the sum of benefits, or in this case, do not 
decrease total costs. 2 1 
A more radical theoretical improvement would be to work 
completely in the extensive form, with the restriction that in 
the beginning, only two- and three-party coalitions would be 
formed and adding the constraint that new coalitions are only 
formed by a merger of two (or possibly three) other coalitions. 
The problem with applying analysis in the extensive form, using 
an algorithm approach similar to dynamic programming to n-person 
is that for n > 4, work in the extensive form is in- 
feasible, due to computer memory and time requirements. If one, 
however, limits oneself to n I 3 in each step, extensive form 
analysis becomes feasible. This would also allow for greater 
realism, since the time path of costs can also be taken into 
account. 
20)~ut not for all games, which can be easily understood, if one 
-
has coalitions which only improve by a very small amount com- 
pared to the entering coalitions. 
) A procedure of this type is proposed in Loehman et a1 ., ( 1979) . 
22)~ee e.g. ~t8hl (1977). 











































APPEND'IX B : GAME INSTRUCTIONS 
You have been invited to participate in a simple game on 
Tuesday, November 27, 1979. 
The game concerns the allocation of costs in a water pro- 
ject, the so-called "Aqua vita" project. This project aims at 
bringing stimulating liquid to six municipalities. You will 
represent one of these. On this occasion, as the sole repre- 
sentative of this municipality, you will represent both the 
producer and the consumer side. 
You will participate in this project either completely on 
your own, or in cooperation with one or several of the other 
participants in the game, who are acting as representatives 
for other municipalities. 
All in all, representatives of six municipalities, called 
A, H, K, L, M, and T, participate in the game. All participants 
(= municipalities) must in some way take part in the water 
project, but their costs will depend on how they form coalitions 
with other participants. 
Should a municipality not enter into coalition with any 
other municipality, it will pay that sum in the allocated table 
which represents what each municipality would be obligated to 
pay if acting alone. Prior to the start of the game, each 
player, i.e. each representative of a municipality, will receive 
this sum in cash from the game leader. 
Each p l a y e r  c a n ,  however,  by a c t i n g  s k i l l f u l l y  b o t h  d u r i n g  
t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  c o a l i t i o n s  and d u r i n g  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of  t h e  
t o t a l  c o s t s  w i t h i n  t h e  c o a l i t i o n ,  g e t  away w i t h  a  l o w e r  payment,  
i n  some c a s e s ,  a  c o n s i d e r a b l y  lower  one .  
The p l a y e r  may k e e p  t h i s  s u r p l u s  f o r  h i m s e l f  ( o r  i f  h e  
wishes  t o  d o  s o ,  may d o n a t e  it a t  t h e  end o f  t h e  game t o  t h e  
Red Cross  f o u n t a i n  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t y  i n  I n d i a ) .  
The d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  game a r e  as f o l l o w s :  
By l o t t e r y ,  e a c h  p l a y e r  i s  a s s i g n e d  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  r e p r e -  
s e n t a t i v e  o f  one  o f  t h e  s i x  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  Next  e a c h  
p l a y e r  o b t a i n s  t h e  a f o r e m e n t i o n e d  sum o f  money c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
t o  t h e  maximum amount t h a t  h e  might  have  t o  pay,  s h o u l d  h e  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  w a t e r  p r o j e c t  c o m p l e t e l y  on  h i s  own. A f t e r  
t h i s ,  t h e  p l a y e r s  s i t  down around t h e  t a b l e  and t h e  c o a l i t i o n -  
fo rmat ion  n e g o t i a t i o n s  c a n  b e g i n .  
The p l a y e r s  t h e n  must  t r y  t o  form c o a l i t i o n s  and  r e a c h  
agreement  o n  how much e a c h  o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  formed 
c o a l i t i o n  s h a l l  pay o f  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  t o  t h e  whole c o a l i t i o n .  
T h i s  t o t a l  c o s t  f o r  e a c h  p o s s i b l e  c o a l i t i o n  i s  s e e n i n  
Appendix A .  
A s  soon as t h e  f i r s t  c o a l i t i o n  h a s  been formed and a g r e e -  
ment h a s  been r e a c h e d  as t o . t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  
o f  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n  among i t s  members, t h e y  r e g i s t e r  t h e  c o a l i -  
t i o n  w i t h  t h e  game d i r e c t o r .  H e  w i l l  t h e n  r e c o r d  t h e  names o f  
t h e  c o a l i t i o n  p a r t i c i p a n t s t a s  w e l l  as t h e  payment e a c h  o f  them 
would make toward  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n .  Once a 
c o a l i t i o n  h a s  been r e g i s t e r e d ,  i t s  c o n t e n t ,  i . e .  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
and t h e  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n ,  i s  announced t o  a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  o f  
t h e  game. 
A coalition does not come into force, however, until 10 
minutes have elapsed since its registration, and then only 
provided that none of its members has been registered in another 
coalition during this period. Hence a player can leave one 
coalition and join another in order to decrease the amount of 
his payment. Furthermore, a coalition dissolves by registering 
a new coalition with additional members. For new coalitions, 
the rule still applies that it does not come into force until it 
has been registered unchanged for 10 minutes. 
Once a coalition has come into force, each ,of its members 
pays the game~leader the amount agreed upon at the time of 
the registration. These participants then cease to take an 
active part in the game, but may remain at the table if they i 
wish to do so. 
The game continues in this way until all participants are 
members of a coalition which has come into force (with the possi- I 
ble exception of a single "leftover" participant) - Should the 
game continue more than 90 minutes from the time of its start, 
it will be brought to an end and those coalitions registered 
(but not broken) at the time will come into force. 
- - 
Finally it should be stressed that the game aims at bringing 
out some aspects of one of the papers presented on Wednesday. 
Hence it is important that you try as much as possiEle to act 
as one could expect a representative for a municipality to act 
during such negotiations, where the economic interest of the 
municipality are at stake. 
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